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The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:

Mr M. Pellonpää, President,
Sir Nicolas Bratza,
Mr A. Pastor Ridruejo,
Mr J. Makarczyk,
Mrs V. Strį˛nickį,
Mr R. Maruste,
Mr S. Pavlovschi, judges,
and Mr M. O'Boyle, Section Registrar,

Having deliberated in private on 21 May 2002,

Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-mentioned date:

1.  The case originated in an application (no. 36042/97) against the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland ("the United Kingdom") lodged with the European Commission on Human Rights ("the Commission") under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention") on behalf of a British National, Mr Kevin David Willis ("the applicant"), on 24 April 1997.

2.  The applicant was represented by Mr S. Wright, a legal officer with the Child Poverty Action Group, London. The United Kingdom Government ("the Government") were represented by their Agent, Mr C. A. Whomersley.

3.  The applicant alleged that British social security legislation discriminated against him and his late wife on grounds of sex, in breach of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with both Article 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

4.  The application was allocated to the Third Section of the Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). Within that Section, the Chamber that would consider the case (Article 27 § 1 of the Convention) was constituted as provided in Rule 26 § 1 of the Rules of Court.

5.  By a decision of 11 May 1999 the Chamber declared the application admissible.

6.  On 1 November 2001, following the new composition of the Court's Sections, the application was re-allocated to the Fourth Section of the Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). Within that Section, the Chamber that would consider the case (Article 27 § 1 of the Convention) was constituted as provided in Rule 26 § 1 of the Rules of Court.

7.  The applicant is a British citizen, born in 1956 and resident in Bristol.

8.  The applicant was married in December 1984 to Marlene Willis. There are two children of the marriage, Natasha Uma, born 24 March 1989, and Ross Amal, born 2 August 1990. Mrs Willis died of cancer on 7 June 1996, aged 39 years. The applicant is the administrator of his late wife's estate.

9.  Mrs Willis was employed as a Local Authority Housing Officer. For the greater part of their married life, Mrs Willis was the primary breadwinner. She paid full social security contributions as an employed earner until 1994, and was subsequently entitled to contribution credits as a person incapable of work. The applicant gave up work to nurse his wife and care for their children on 3 November 1995. Following his wife's death he worked part-time between 2 September 1996 and 6 November 1996, at an annual salary of GBP 4,393, but since this proved uneconomic the applicant ceased his employment to care full-time for the children.

10.  On 4 November 1996 the applicant applied to the Benefits Agency for the payment of social security benefits. He applied for benefits equivalent to those which a widow whose husband had died in similar circumstances to those of Mrs Willis would have been entitled, namely a Widow's Payment and a Widowed Mother's Allowance, payable under the Social Security and Benefits Act 1992 ("the 1992 Act").

11.  By a letter dated 18 November 1996, the Benefits Agency informed the applicant that the benefits he had claimed did not exist for widowers, and that his claim accordingly could not be accepted as valid. The letter continued:

12.  The applicant lodged a statutory appeal against this decision on 17 February 1997. The Social Security Appeal Tribunal declined jurisdiction on the basis that no appealable decision had been made.

13.  The applicant currently receives Child Benefit and, in respect of his son Ross, received Disability Living Allowance and Invalid Care Allowance for a period following his wife's death. He is also in receipt of a widower's pension under Mrs Willis's occupational pension scheme. The applicant has capital, much of which is derived from a joint endowment policy (for which he and Mrs Willis had paid premiums) which matured on Mrs Willis's death, from which he obtains a further income of about GBP 150 per month. Because of his savings, the applicant does not qualify for means-tested benefits such as Income Support or Family Credit. All the social security benefits he receives would also be received by a widow who would in addition be paid Widow's Payment and Widowed Mother's Allowance.

14.  Under United Kingdom law, certain social security benefits, including Widow's Payment, Widowed Mother's Allowance, and Widow's Pension, are paid for out of the National Insurance Fund. By Section 1 of the 1992 Act, the funds required for paying such benefits are to be provided by means of contributions payable to the Secretary of State for Social Security by earners, employers and others, together with certain additions made to the Fund by Parliament.

15.  Male and female earners are obliged to pay the same social security contributions in accordance with their status as employed earners or self-employed earners.

16.  Under Section 36 of the 1992 Act, a woman who has been widowed is entitled to a Widow's Payment (a lump sum payment of GBP 1,000) if:

(i) she is under pensionable age at the time when her husband died, or he was not then entitled to a Category A retirement pension; and

(ii) her husband satisfied certain specified social security contribution conditions set out in a Schedule to the 1992 Act.

17.  Under Section 37 of the 1992 Act, in so far as relevant, a woman who has been widowed (and who has not remarried) is entitled to a mother's allowance on certain conditions, the following being the relevant conditions to the circumstance of the present case:

(i) her husband satisfied the contribution conditions set out in a Schedule to the Act; and

(ii) she is entitled to receive child benefit in relation to a son or daughter of herself and her late husband.

The Widowed Mother's Allowance currently amounts to GBP 72.50 per week, with an extra GBP 9.70 per week in respect of the eldest eligible child, and a further GBP 11.35 per week in respect of other children.

18.  Under Section 38 of the 1992 Act, a woman who has been widowed (and who is not remarried) is entitled to a Widow's Pension if her husband satisfied the contribution conditions set out in a Schedule to the Act; and

(i) at the date of her husband's death she was over the age of 45 but under the age of 65; or

(ii) she ceased to be entitled to a widowed mother's allowance at the time when she was over the age of 45 but under the age of 65.

If the applicant were a woman, he could look forward to entitlement to a Widow's Pension at some stage between 2006 and 2009, depending upon when his youngest child ceased to be a dependant, at which time he would no longer be entitled to the Widowed Mother's Allowance.

19.  Section 1(1) of the 1992 Act, which applies to the applicant, provides that no entitlement to a benefit arises unless a claim for the benefit is made in the prescribed manner and within the prescribed time.

At the relevant time, the time-limits for claiming Widow's Payment and Widowed Mother's Allowance were set out in the Social Security (Claims and Payments) Regulations 1987 (Statutory Instrument 1987/1968), regulation 19 of which provided:

In addition, section 1(2) of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 provides, in relation to claims for Widow's Payment:

20.  The Welfare Reform and Pensions Act ("the 1999 Act") introduces two new social security benefits, Widowed Parent's Allowance and Bereavement Allowance. The Widowed Parent's Allowance replaces the Widowed Mother's Allowance. The Bereavement Allowance replaces the Widow's Pension. Both will be payable to men and women who meet the relevant qualifying conditions. The 1999 Act also introduces a new social security payment, called a Bereavement Payment, payable both to men and women in place of the Widow's Payment.

21.  The relevant parts of the Act entered into force on 9 April 2001 and allow any man whose wife dies before, on or after that date, or any woman whose husband dies on or after that date, to apply for Widowed Parent's Allowance. It also allows any man whose wife dies on or after that date to apply for Bereavement Payment or Bereavement Allowance in exactly the same way as a woman whose husband dies on or after that date.

22.  The transitional provisions of the 1999 Act preserve the entitlements of women under the 1992 Act whose husbands died before 9 April 2001. Such women thus continue to be entitled to the Widow's Payment, Widowed Mother's Allowance and Widow's Pension where the relevant qualifying conditions are met.

23.  On 14 February 2002, Mr Justice Moses delivered judgment in the High Court in a case brought by four claimants, all of whom were widowers claiming, inter alia, that their ineligibility for widows' benefits under the 1992 Act was discriminatory contrary to Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with both Article 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Three of the claimants had been left with dependent children, with the result that the benefits at issue in their cases were Widow's Payment and Widowed Mother's Allowance. The fourth claimant (Mr Naylor) had been left without dependent children, with the result that the benefits at issue in his case were Widow's Payment and Widow's Pension.

24.  The defendant Government Department conceded before the High Court that there had been discrimination under Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention in relation to non-payment of Widowed Mother's Allowance. As regards the question of whether the claimants' complaints, so far as they related to Widow's Payment and Widow's Pension, fell within the ambit of Article 8, Mr Justice Moses commented that:

25.  In dismissing the claimants' arguments that the same complaints fell also within the ambit of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, Mr Justice Moses commented that:

26.  Prior to his examination of whether there was objective justification for non-payment of Widow's Pension to widowers, Mr Justice Moses observed that:

Mr Justice Moses concluded that there was objective justification for the difference in treatment between widows and widowers as regards entitlement to Widow's Pension under the 1992 Act.

27.  The applicant complained that the United Kingdom authorities' refusal to pay him the social security benefits to which he would have been entitled had he been a woman in a similar position, namely Widowed Mother's Allowance and Widow's Payment, constituted discrimination against him and his wife on grounds of sex contrary to Article 14 taken in conjunction with each of Article 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. He made an identical complaint as regards his future non-entitlement to a Widow's Pension. He complained also of a violation of Article 13 of the Convention.

28.  The applicant complained that the United Kingdom authorities' refusal to pay him the social security benefits to which he would have been entitled had he been a woman in a similar position, namely Widowed Mother's Allowance and Widow's Payment, constituted discrimination against him and his wife on grounds of sex contrary to Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. He made an identical complaint as regards his future non-entitlement to a Widow's Pension.

Article 14 provides:

Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 provides:

29.  The Court recalls that, according to its established case-law, Article 14 of the Convention complements the other substantive provisions of the Convention and the Protocols. It has no independent existence since it has effect solely in relation to "the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms" safeguarded by those provisions. Although the application of Article 14 does not presuppose a breach of those provisions - and to this extent it is autonomous - there can be no room for its application unless the facts at issue fall within the ambit of one or more of them (see, among other authorities, the Gaygusuz v. Austria judgment of 16 September 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-IV, p. 11, § 36).

30.  The applicant argued that Widow's Payment and Widowed Mother's Allowance are within the ambit of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 because they are both pecuniary rights payable on the satisfaction of the legislative conditions. He highlighted the fact that the right to receive the benefits in question is conditional upon the payment of contributions to the National Insurance Fund. As the contributions were clearly within the ambit of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, so must be the ensuing benefits.

31.  The Government did not make any submissions on the applicability of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in relation to these aspects of the complaint, other than to argue that the conclusions reached by Mr Justice Moses in the High Court in the Hooper case (see paragraph 25 above) were correct.

32.  The Court recalls that, in the above-mentioned Gaygusuz case (at §§ 39-41), it considered that the right to emergency assistance, entitlement to which was linked to the payment of contributions to the unemployment insurance fund, constituted a pecuniary right for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Similarly, the Commission has previously assimilated the right to social security benefits to a property right within the meaning of that Article where a person has made contributions to a social security system from which he will later derive the benefits concerned (see, for example, application no. 5849/72 Müller v. Austria 3 DR 25 (1975) and application no. 10094/82 G v. Austria 38 DR 84 (1984)).

33.  The Court notes that at the material time Widow's Payment and Widowed Mother's Allowance were paid to women who had been widowed and who satisfied the various statutory conditions laid down in the 1992 Act (see paragraphs 16 and 17 above). Both these social security benefits were paid out of the National Insurance Fund, into which male and female earners were obliged to pay contributions in accordance with their status as employed or self-employed earners.

34.  In the instant case, it has not been argued that the applicant did not satisfy the various statutory conditions for payment of a Widow's Payment and Widowed Mother's Allowance. The refusal to recognise the applicant as being entitled to those benefits was based exclusively on his male sex. A female in the same position as the applicant would have had a right, enforceable under domestic law, to receive a Widow's Payment and Widowed Mother's Allowance.

35.  The Court does not consider it significant that the statutory condition requiring payment of contributions into the National Insurance Fund required the contributions to have been made, not by the applicant, but by his late wife. It is not therefore necessary for the Court to address in this case the question of whether a social security benefit must be contributory in nature in order that it can constitute a "possession" for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

36.  The Court therefore considers that the right to a Widow's Payment and Widowed Mother's Allowance - in so far as provided for in the applicable legislation - is a sufficiently pecuniary right to fall within the ambit of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

The Court considers further that, as the applicant was denied the right to a Widow's Payment and Widowed Mother's Allowance on the ground of a distinction covered by Article 14, namely sex, that provision must also be applicable to this aspect of his complaint (see, among other authorities, the Gaygusuz v. Austria judgment previously cited, p. 12, § 41).

37.  The applicant argued that the difference in treatment between men and women as regards entitlement to a Widow's Payment and Widowed Mother's Allowance was not based on any objective and reasonable justification. In particular, it was based upon gender-stereotyping and broad generalisations which were no longer an accurate reflection of social conditions in the United Kingdom. The fact that widows' benefits were not means-tested meant that high earning women in a position similar to that of the applicant would benefit, while the applicant and other men would be denied such benefits regardless of their need. The fact that resources were finite did not justify concentrating all the resources which were available on the protection of bereaved women to the detriment of widowed men. Indeed, the applicant highlighted the fact that working women in the position of his wife were required to pay the same proportion of their earnings to the National Insurance Fund as men notwithstanding the more limited benefits offered to their surviving relatives in the event of their death. He pointed out the less discriminatory approaches taken by the majority of the other Member States of the Council of Europe in the context of survivors' benefits.

38.  The Government did not make any submissions on the compliance with Article 14 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, of the decision to refuse the applicant Widowed Mother's Allowance and Widow's Payment.

39.  According to the Court's case-law, a difference of treatment is discriminatory for the purposes of Article 14 if it "has no objective and reasonable justification", that is if it does not pursue a "legitimate aim" or if there is not a "reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised". The Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether and to what extent differences in otherwise similar situations justify a different treatment. However, very weighty reasons would have to be put forward before the Court could regard a difference of treatment based exclusively on the ground of sex as compatible with the Convention (see, among other authorities, the Van Raalte v. the Netherlands judgment of 21 February 1997, Reports 1997-I, § 39).

40.  The Court notes that the applicant's wife worked throughout the majority of her marriage to the applicant and during that time paid full social security contributions as an employed earner in exactly the same way as a man in her position would have done. It notes also that the applicant gave up work to nurse his wife and care for their children on 3 November 1995 and that, being a relatively low earner, it proved uneconomic for him to return to work on a part-time basis following his wife's death. Despite all this, the applicant was entitled to significantly fewer financial benefits upon his wife's death than he would have been if he were a woman and she were a man.

41.  The Court observes also that the authorities' refusal to grant the applicant a Widow's Payment and Widowed Mother's Allowance was based exclusively on the fact that he was a man. It has not been argued that the applicant failed to satisfy any of the other statutory conditions for the award of those benefits and he was accordingly in a like situation to women as regards his entitlement to them.

42.  The Court considers that the difference in treatment between men and women as regards entitlement to the Widow's Payment and Widowed Mother's Allowance, of which the applicant was a victim, was not based on any "objective and reasonable justification".

43.  There has accordingly been a violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

44.  The applicant stated that he faced a very significant risk that he would, within the next few years, be deprived on the grounds of his sex of a Widow's Pension to which he would otherwise have been entitled. He argued that he was already suffering detriment due to his being deprived of the possibility of ever applying for a Widow's Pension.

45.  The applicant maintained that a Widow's Pension constituted a "possession" for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. He pointed to the fact that it was a pecuniary social benefit, entitlement to which was linked to the satisfaction of statutory conditions, including the payment of National Insurance contributions. He submitted that the conditions applied to eligibility to a Widow's Pension were discriminatory against him and that his case was thus indistinguishable from the above-mentioned Gaygusuz case.

46.  The Government pointed out that a widow in the applicant's position would not be entitled to a Widow's Pension until at least 2006, and possibly not until 2009, which is the latest date on which the applicant's youngest child will cease to be regarded as being dependent. They stated that a woman in the applicant's position might never qualify for a Widow's Pension because she might not, at the time of her future claim, meet the relevant statutory criteria. The Government thus considered this aspect of the complaint hypothetical and speculative.

47.  The Government argued that, in any event, a Widow's Pension did not fall within the scope of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 since it did not constitute a "possession" for the purposes of that Article. They highlighted the fact that entitlement to a Widow's Pension was dependent upon the National Insurance contributions of the deceased spouse of the claimant. They indicated that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 did not entitle a person to any particular benefit of any particular amount, nor did it entitle a person to payment of a social security benefit unless that person had satisfied the conditions laid down by domestic law. The drew support for their submissions from the judgment of the High Court in the Hooper case (see paragraph 25 above).

48.  The Court recalls that Article 14 of the Convention affords protection against discrimination, that is treating differently, without an objective and reasonable justification, persons in relevantly similar situations (see, for example, Fredin v. Sweden (no.1), judgment of 18 February 1991, Series A no. 192, § 60).

49.  In the present case, even if the applicant were a woman and the discrimination of which he complains was thus removed, he would not currently qualify for a Widow's Pension under the conditions set out in the 1992 Act. Indeed, a widow in the applicant's position would not qualify for the Pension until at least 2006 and might never so qualify due to the effect of other statutory conditions requiring, for example, that a claimant does not re-marry before the date on which her entitlement would otherwise crystallise. Three of the four claimants in the above-mentioned Hooper case were in an equivalent position to the applicant in this respect, leading Mr Justice Moses to comment that their claims to the Pension were "hypothetical" (see paragraph 26 above).

50.  The Court thus concludes that, since the applicant has not been treated differently from a woman in an analogous situation, no issue of discrimination contrary to Article 14 arises as regards entitlement to a Widow's Pension on the facts of this case.

It follows that it is unnecessary for the Court to consider whether the applicant's complaints in this context fall within the scope of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

51.  The applicant also complained that the United Kingdom authorities' refusal to pay him the Widow's Payment and Widowed Mother's Allowance to which he would have been entitled had he been a woman in a similar position constituted discrimination on grounds of sex contrary to Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 8. He made an identical complaint as regards his future non-entitlement to a Widow's Pension.

52.  Article 8 provides (as relevant):

53.  The Court, having concluded that there has been a breach of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 as regards the applicant's non-entitlement to Widowed Mother's Allowance and Widow's Payment, does not consider it necessary to examine his complaints in that regard under Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 8.

54.  The applicant argued that the provision of a Widow's Pension to a surviving spouse was clearly intended to promote family life. He maintained that a Widow's Pension was paid to, among others, a widow who had dependent children at the date of her husband's death once she was no longer in receipt of child benefits. He submitted that the provision of the Pension to a surviving spouse was intended to recognise and promote the family relationship between spouses and that entitlement to it affected the way in which married partners arranged their financial affairs. He thus submitted that his complaint as regards future non-entitlement to a Widow's Pension fell within the ambit of Article 8 of the Convention.

55.  The Government, at the outset, submitted that the Widow's Pension did not fall within the ambit of Article 8 of the Convention because it was payable following bereavement and, in contrast to Widowed Mother's Allowance, was not aimed at enhancing family or private life. However, later in the proceedings before the Court the Government accepted the applicant's argument that Widow's Pension fell within the ambit of that Article.

56.  The Court has already concluded (at paragraph 50 above) that no issue of discrimination contrary to Article 14 arises as regards entitlement to a Widow's Pension on the facts of this case.

It follows that it is unnecessary for the Court to consider whether the applicant's complaints in the context of Widow's Pension fall within the scope of Article 8 of the Convention.

57.  The applicant complained also about discrimination suffered by his late wife in respect of the decision to refuse him Widow's Payment and Widowed Mother's Allowance, and in respect of his future non-entitlement to Widow's Pension, notwithstanding the social security contributions made by her during her lifetime. The Court considers that this aspect of the complaint does not raise any issues separate from those raised in respect of the discrimination alleged to have been suffered by the applicant himself. In light of the conclusions reached above, the Court does not consider it necessary to consider this aspect of the complaint.

58.  The applicant also complained that he had no effective remedy before a national authority because the discrimination of which he complained was contained within unambiguous primary legislation.

59.  Article 13 provides:

60.  The applicant argued that, because the discrimination of which he complained was contained in unambiguous primary legislation, and because the Convention had not at the relevant time been incorporated into domestic law, there were no means by which he could challenge the refusal of benefits before the domestic courts or other authorities.

61.  The Government did not submit any observations on the merits of the applicant's complaints.

62.  The Court recalls that Article 13 does not go so far as to guarantee a remedy allowing a Contracting State's primary legislation to be challenged before a national authority on grounds that it is contrary to the Convention (see the James and Others v. the United Kingdom judgment of 21 February 1986, Series A no. 98, § 85). It is therefore unable to accept the applicant's argument.

63.  The facts of the present case therefore disclose no violation of Article 13 of the Convention.

64.  Article 41 provides:

65.  For pecuniary damage the applicant claimed:

66.  The Government accepted the applicant's calculation in respect of Widow's Payment and Widowed Mother's Allowance payable up to 9 April 2001. It opposed the applicant's claim for interest on the basis that social security benefits are not generally paid for investment purposes.

The Government thus concluded that the applicant was entitled to GBP 21,804.07 in respect of pecuniary damage.

67.  The Court notes that the applicant's calculations as to the amount of Widow's Payment and Widowed Mother's Allowance payable after deductions until implementation of the new scheme created by the 1999 Act on 9 April 2001 is not disputed by the Government.

68.  The Court further observes that, as from 10 April 2001, the applicant has been entitled to claim Widowed Parent's Allowance in exactly the same way as he could, had he been a woman, have claimed Widowed Mother's Allowance under the 1992 Act.

69.  The Court considers that interest can be claimed from the dates on which each recoverable element of past pecuniary damage accrued (see, among other authorities, Lustig-Prean and Beckett v. the United Kingdom (just satisfaction), nos. 31417/96 and 32377/96, 25.7.2000, § 28, unreported).

70.  In such circumstances, and making an award on an equitable basis, the Court awards compensation to the applicant in the sum of GBP 25,000 (twenty-five thousand pounds sterling) in respect of refusal of a Widow's Payment and loss of Widowed Mother's Allowance up to 9 April 2001

71.  The applicant also claimed GBP 19,142.94 in respect of costs and expenses, inclusive of value added tax ("VAT"). This included the fees of the applicant's solicitors and counsel together with fees for liaison with other non-governmental organisations in connection with the case and the fees of an expert social economist.

72.  The Government did not dispute the base hourly rates claimed by the applicant's solicitors, but submitted that a 100 per cent uplift on those fees was unjustified. They stated that the hourly rate charged by the applicant's counsel was also excessive. They argued that sums in respect of liaison with other non-governmental organisations should not be recoverable and maintained that, if their preliminary objections as to the applicant's complaint relating to non-entitlement to Widow's Pension was upheld by the Court, the applicant should not be entitled to that part of his costs and expenses connected to that complaint. The Government suggested that a reasonable sum in respect of costs and expenses would be GBP 3,000 inclusive of VAT.

73.  The Court recalls that only legal costs and expenses found to have been actually and necessarily incurred and which are reasonable as to quantum are recoverable under Article 41 of the Convention (see, among other authorities, Nikolova v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 31195/96, ECHR 1999-II, § 79).

74.  The Court does not consider that its conclusions in respect of the applicant's complaint about non-entitlement to a Widow's Pension imply that the associated legal costs and expenses were unnecessarily incurred or were unreasonable as to quantum (see Smith and Grady v. the United Kingdom (just satisfaction), no. 33985/96, § 30, ECHR 2000-IX; and Jordan v. the United Kingdom, no. 30280/96, 14.3.2000, § 42). However, it does consider that the uplift included in the solicitor's fees was unwarranted and that the counsel's fees were excessive.

In light of these matters, the Court awards the global sum of GBP 12,500 (twelve thousand five hundred pounds sterling) for legal costs and expenses, inclusive of VAT.

75.  According to the information available to the Court, the statutory rate of interest applicable in the United Kingdom at the date of adoption of the present judgment is 7.5% per annum.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 11 June 2002, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Michael O'Boyle Matti Pellonpää
Registrar President